Ever since I was turned away for not presenting my driver’s license in 2004, I’ve been voting by mail. I forgot about the August 8 primary election. The soon-to-be-retired-but-not-soon-enough-for-me County Clerk Mildred Alsdorf didn’t post an election announcement in The Paper until 8 days before the election, which made it too late to apply for a mail-in (or absentee) ballot unless I drove to Glenwood Springs and applied in person. The article mentioned early voting in Rifle. So I chose that option. There was some confusion as the article stated early voting was in the new Human Services Building and the Garfield County website said early voting was in the DMV building about a mile away. Tod called the County Clerk’s office but the woman he spoke to didn’t seemed too concerned about the mix-up.
Early voting was held in the Human Services Building with shiny new Hart InterCivic voting machines. An article in The Paper last spring described how they work.
New electronic voting machines to be in place for next county election
By Donna Gray
It’s official. Garfield County voters will cast their choices on new electronic voting machines this year, possibly as early as August. County Clerk and Recorder Mildred Alsdorf this week signed a contract with Hart Intercivic for 13 touch-screen voting machines and 14 ballot scanners, Alsdorf said …
Last year, the Colorado Secretary of State mandated that electronic voting machines be in place in all counties in time for the 2006 elections. The machines will help the counties meet the requirements of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Hart’s “eSlate,” or direct recording equipment, is designed for disabled voters who use buttons on a computer-like screen built into a portable voting booth. Voters navigate through the ballot with a large wheel inset into a tablet that allows the voter to scroll through the candidates’ names and make a mark by the selected candidate’s name.
Blind voters can listen to a synthetic voice that talks them through the ballot.
Ballot scanners read paper ballots filled in by voters and tabulate the results.
“I want to be sure to have a paper trail,” Alsdorf said …
Prior to August 1, I was a black box voting virgin. I’d never voted on a computer. Ever. I condemned them, signed petitions against them, wrote letters against them. But never voted on one. Now I have. And I still don’t like them.
The problem with voting on a computer is so obvious. It’s a computer! Unless the data is being stored and backed up constantly elsewhere, it can be easily lost, let’s say in a power outage, or hard drive malfunction. Anyone who’s ever owned a computer knows this.
We keep hearing on the news about people’s personal information being stolen off computers, and NSA spying on people’s phone calls and computers. We know hackers and the government can access our telephones and computers. So how hard could it be to hack a voting machine?
Not very. Anyone can do it. Here’s a funny video to show you how:
How to Hack a Diebold Voting Machine by Marty Kaplan
In a current article for Forbes Magazine, Aviel Rubin (Computer Science Professor at Johns Hopkins University) describes how voting machines can be hacked and explains why he thinks the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail – or VVPAT – is the answer.
Pull the Plug
By Aviel Rubin
I am a computer scientist. I own seven Macintosh computers, one Windows machine and a Palm Treo 700p with a GPS unit, and I chose my car (Infiniti M35x) because it had the most gadgets of any vehicle in its class. My 7-year-old daughter uses e-mail. So why am I advocating the use of 17th-century technology for voting in the 21st century-as one of my critics puts it?
… Yet while computers are very proficient at counting, displaying choices and producing records, we should not rely on computers alone to count votes in public elections. The people who program them make mistakes, and, safeguards aside, they are more vulnerable to manipulation than most people realize. Even an event as common as a power glitch could cause a hard disk to fail or a magnetic card that holds votes to permanently lose its data. The only remedy then: Ask voters to come back to the polls. In a 2003 election in Boone County, Ind., DREs recorded 144,000 votes in one precinct populated with fewer than 6,000 registered voters. Though election officials caught the error, it’s easy to imagine a scenario where such mistakes would go undetected until after a victor has been declared …
My ideal system isn’t entirely Luddite. It physically separates the candidate selection process from vote casting. Voters make their selections on a touchscreen machine, but the machine does not tabulate votes. It simply prints out paper ballots with the voters’ choices marked. The voters review the paper ballots to make sure the votes have been properly recorded. Then the votes are counted; one way is by running them through an optical scanner. After the polls close, some number of precincts are chosen at random, and the ballots are hand counted and compared with the optical scan totals to make sure they are accurate. The beauty of this system is that it leaves a tangible audit trail. Even the designer of the system cannot cheat if the voters check the printed ballots and if the optical scanners are audited.
Oh wow. I get it. With VVPAT all our black box voting problems will be solved. And it’s all so simple. Hallelujah!
Not so fast.
As Mildred pointed out, the Hart InterCivic VVPAT version I voted on (which looks EXACTLY like the Diebold) has a paper trail. Why, I even walked out of the polling place with a little paper receipt in my hand and an “I Voted” sticker on my shirt. My vote was safe. Right?
According Hart InterCivic’s website:
The VVPAT is integrated into the Hart voting booth for voter security, while minimizing space needs and required set-up time for the poll worker.
Produces the paper equivalent of the voter’s choices so the voter can view it via a method that is completely independent of the voting system.
The VVPAT is sealed for security.
The paper record shall constitute a complete record of the voter’s ballot choice to verify the election results and for full recounts.
All of which means your grubby little fingers never touch your ballot and supposedly nobody else’s grubby little fingers – you get the idea. Whew. I’m glad we solved that problem. You know, the one about people messing with the ballots.
Wait a minute. That’s not the problem with voting machines. Messing with the MACHINES is the problem.
A study released this month by the Election Science Institute uncovered “multiple problems” with VVPAT.
New Report Analyzes Multiple Problems With Diebold Touchscreen Voting Machines
By Warren Stewart, VoteTrustUSA
Computer generated election results prove inconsistent with an audit of voter-reviewed paper records - Diebold Does Damage Control
A new study of significant vote counting problems during the May 2006 primary election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio reveals that the Diebold TSx touchscreen voting system causes significant threats to error free tabulation and tabulation transparency. Last spring the Cuyahoga County Election Commissioners engaged Election Science Institute (ESI) to review all aspects of the new voting system and prepare a report on their findings with recommendations.
The report examined vote tallies from 467 voting machines used at 50 polling locations in the county were examined. The report found that every method of verification of the vote failed. None of the vote counts matched on any media in the voting system - every redundancy built in the system failed.
ESI conducted a hand count of the voter-verified paper record (VVPAT), which in Ohio constitutes the official vote of record, and compared the results to the totals generated by each of these sources. Although the discrepancies between the VVPAT and the paper record summaries were relatively small, “discrepancies between the paper record and the electronic record were considerably larger and more pervasive”, according to the report.
“The current election system appears to provide some of its promised benefits at potentially great cost; namely, that the election system, in its entirety, exhibits shortcomings with extremely serious consequences, especially in the event of a close election. These shortcomings merit your urgent attention. Relying on this system in its present state should be viewed as a calculated risk in which the outcome may be an acceptable election, but there is a heightened risk of unacceptable cost.”
The report did not define what constituted “an acceptable election” and what would an “unacceptable cost”.
Interviewed in the Columbus-Dispatch, ESI founder Steven Hertzberg said that researchers can’t yet explain the discrepancies and that more study should be done among researchers, Diebold and election officials. ESI was reportedly paid $341,000 for the study.
Hertzberg was careful not to assign blame, noting “We need to understand much better why this occurred, whether it was human error, machine error or a combination of both,” he said. Not surprisingly, both Diebold and the Ohio Secretary of state were quick to defend the machines.
“The discrepancies they found were not discrepancies,” Diebold spokesman Mark Radke said, arguing “the same system was has been used without problems in other Ohio counties and many other states”. Of course that system has not received this level of scrutiny in other Ohio counties or states and the report did conclude that the problems uncovered in Cuyahoga County are “systemic and therefore faced by other counties nationally and across Ohio.”
Secretary of State and former Diebold stockholder Ken Blackwell was quick to blame pollworkers and exonerate the machines. According to the Columbus-Dispatch article, Blackwell spokesman James Lee blamed inadequate poll worker training in Cuyahoga County, noting the machines were exhaustively tested before they were deployed. “No matter what system is used, if there is not proper training and adherence to procedures, there are going to be problems,” he said.
And problems there were. The study included an “exhaustive analysis of regular voted ballots from onboard machine memory compared to manual counts of paper ballots, official results, and other interim and election reports”. The report found a lack of inventory controls and gaps in the chain of custody of mission critical assets, such as DRE memory cards, DRE units, and VVPAT cartridges, resulted in a significant amount of missing data. Because of the missing data, ESI was unable to give a definitive opinion of the accuracy of the Diebold TSX system.
ESI suggested that due to limits in the data, software computational abnormality contributing to the count inaccuracies cannot be ruled out. Computational abnormality could be the result of a failure to adequately test the voting equipment before the election or to manage the various databases appropriately.
And it gets worse, ESI reported that in multi-precinct polling places, voters could vote on machines located in other precincts. Accordingly, ballots from a number of precincts appeared on the same VVPAT tape. It appears that Diebold VVPAT ballots, however, lack a header identifying the precinct and without this information, it is not possible to conduct a precinct-level tally of the VVPAT ballots. Overall, data could not be retrieved for 13 VVPAT summaries, 87 VVPAT cartridges, 53 election archives and 3 DRE memory cards, which were used to tabulate the official vote count.
In the end, the researchers of this report simply couldn’t determine the source of discrepant vote data. This report lends credence to the concerns of voters, candidates, and election officials, expressed since the introduction of electronic voting, that elections using these machines cannot be trusted.
Oops. Guess VVPAT doesn’t solve the voting machine problems after all.
Proponents of voting machines insist they save money. However a study by NC Voter, a North Carolina Coalition for Verified Voting showed that paper ballots are more cost-effective.
Operating Cost Comparison for Different Types of Voting Systems
By Joyce McCloy
Touchscreen Voting Increases Election Costs in North Carolina
A Comparison of Total Annual Expenditures for TouchScreens and Optical Scanners
Not only have computer scientists advised the North Carolina Legislature that touch screen voting machines are less reliable and accurate than optical scan equipment, we find that they are more costly to own and operate. Clearly, this is no way to run an election.
Opponents to voter verified paper ballots often cited costs of printing paper ballots as an excuse for using paperless all electronic voting machines. They also used the argument that optical scan ballots take up more space, therefore increasing costs. We were intrigued, and set out to seek the truth.
The NC Coalition for Verified Voting, in 2005 - completed a study of annual expenditures of the election departments of four North Carolina counties. We found that the cost of using touch screen voting or direct recording machines in Guilford and Mecklenburg county was about 30-40% higher than the cost of using optical scan equipment in Wake and Durham county. This means that not only are touch screens more expensive to acquire, they are also more expensive to operate year after year.
One factor that may explain why having touch screens cost so much more than optical scanners is because the county has to own and maintain so many more machines. We estimate that one optical scanner can count handle six voter?s votes a minute (or 360 per hour) as they are cast but because it takes a voter at least three minutes to vote with touch screens, it would take 20 touch screens to perform per hour as well as optical scanners. Additionally, touch screen machines use thermal paper ballots - both require special handling and climate controlled storage. Justin Moore, of Duke University Computer Science Department found that counties using touch screen machines required 20% more poll workers, and about 10% more precincts.
A new Zogby poll released this week reveals that people are finally waking up to the problems with voting machines and how they affect our elections.
Americans Concerned About Election Transparency and Security
New poll shows more than 60% have heard news reports of flaws in new electronic voting equipment
A majority of Americans—61%—are aware of news reports of flaws in electronic voting machines and want members of the general public to be able to watch votes be counted following an election, a new Zogby International poll shows.
The telephone survey of 1,018 likely voters was conducted Aug. 11-15, 2006. It carries a margin of error of +/- 3.1 percentage points.
Asked whether Americans have the right to view and obtain information about how elections officials count votes, 92% of respondents concurred.
“The 92% support for the public’s right to view vote counting and obtain information about it is a very strong political value of transparency and against secret vote counting outside the observation of the public,” said Paul Lehto, a lawyer and sponsor of the survey. “To put this figure in context, support for election transparency exceeds the support for tax cuts, exceeds the approval of Pres. Bush immediately after 9-11, and virtually all other political values being measured.” Mr. Lehto is counsel in the 50th Congressional District election contest in California.
In the article about Garfield County’s new voting machines (above), Mildred said it takes longer to vote on a voting machine than a paper ballot:
Alsdorf said she’d also like to have people come in and practice on the machines before the elections so they can familiarize themselves with the new voting process.
In March, Alsdorf invited several older people and some who are disabled to try out the Hart “eSlate.” Most took about 10 minutes to cast votes on a dummy ballot.
“It takes a lot longer (than a paper ballot). I’m afraid the November ballot will be a big one,” she said. “There are 12 state issues already, and I’ve heard Re-2 wants a bond issue.”
So, voting machines are not only unreliable, but they cost more and take more time than paper ballots. If VVPAT isn’t the answer, how do we get back our confidence in the voting process?
Go back to paper ballots.
As the old saying goes: “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. HAVA was passed in 2002 to address the problems with the 2000 election. Except the actual voting problem was only in Florida and involved poorly designed butterfly ballots. The voting machines were forced on us as a solution to the butterfly ballot. Now the problems created by voting machines dwarf the problems with butterfly ballots. The whole thing is laughable.
The biggest problem with the 2000 election was that ALL the votes were not counted in Florida, and the US Supreme Court stopped the recount.
The same article also said:
The voting machines will electronically tabulate the votes at each polling place, eliminating the time-consuming job of carrying the ballots back to the courthouse for counting.
The solution to this problem is easy. Counties invest in vote tabulation systems where each Precinct Chairperson logs into a vote tabulator on site that is connected to another computer in the courthouse and enters the hand count of paper ballots. Those counts are later verified when the ballots are delivered to the courthouse.
Finally, Maryland voting rights activist Mary Howe Kiraly has a compiled an online review of what has been done to address voters’ concerns about security and voting machines. Hint: nothing
“IT” Happens: HAVA, Exit Polls, Diebold & More By Voting Security: Where We Stand in 2006
Kiraly concludes:
Recent scientific analysis has found that all electronic voting machines are vulnerable to breakdowns, lost votes, ballot formatting errors, and errors in computation. They are also vulnerable to deliberate efforts, by a wide range of potential actors, to hack the system and change the outcome of an election. This vulnerability exists in two stages: (1) at the voting machine where the voter interacts with the machine to mark and/or record a ballot; and (2) at the level of tabulation where the accumulated data from various machines and/or various precincts is accumulated to produce voting totals.
Forget the punch card ballots, butterfly ballots, and voting machines. We should return to paper ballots. And allow mail-in ballots and early voting. Going back to this simple, hands-on, open system is just a start in returning confidence to our election process. In the next installment I’ll cover voter disenfranchisement and how Americans are being prevented from casting their votes.
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